Responding to Other Objections to the Fine Tuning Argument

 

We have already discussed the possibility of a multiverse, being behind this fine-tuned universe. Let’s address a few other objections.

Neil Sinhababu (Am Philos Q 54(1):89–98, 2017) has recently argued against the fine-tuning argument for God. They claim that the question of the universe’s fine-tuning ought not be ‘why is the universe so hospitable to life?’ but rather ‘why is the universe so hospitable to morally valuable minds?’ and that, moreover, the universe isn’t so hospitable.

For it is metaphysically possible that psychophysical laws be substantially more permissive than they in fact are, allowing for the realisation of morally valuable consciousness by exceptionally simple physical states and systems, rather than the complex states of brains.

I reply that Sinhababu’s argument rests upon unsupported claims and that we have reason to doubt that an omnibenevolent God would make the psychophysical laws more permissive than they in fact are.

 

Physical cosmologists claim that the universe is balanced on a razor’s-edge as far as human life is concerned. Our existence would be impossible had not various forces and constants taken the values that they in fact do. In some cases, minute diferences in those values would have entailed a universe devoid of any structure, let alone the complexity to support life.

Three examples of such fne-tuning observations are as follows:

·         Gravity

·         Rate of expansion of early universe

·         Strong nuclear force



Sinhababu’s response to the fine-tuning argument may be reconstructed as proceeding in three stages: reframing the central question, the universe is not particularly hospitable to morally valuable minds, theists must affirm the metaphysical possibility of the e‑world, on pain of inconsistence.

Against Sinhababu’s argument:

Against Indifference Objections to the Fine-Tuning Argument (Prof. Metcalf)

https://tinyurl.com/4ex9jhf6

Explaining the Physicality of the Universe:

The Argument from Compatibility:

1. Given theism, any feature F that the actual world ends up having will, with probability unity, be G-compatible.

2. Given atheism, any feature F that the actual world ends up having will, with probability less-than-unity, be G-compatible.

3. Therefore, for any feature F that the actual world ends up having, the probability, given theism, that F will be G-compatible is higher than the probability, given atheism, that F will be G-compatible.

4. A world’s being physical is G-compatible.

5. Therefore, a world’s being physical is prima facie evidence for theism over atheism.
















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