Responding to Other Objections to the Fine Tuning Argument
We have already discussed the
possibility of a multiverse, being behind this fine-tuned universe. Let’s address a few other objections.
Neil Sinhababu (Am Philos Q 54(1):89–98,
2017) has recently argued against the fine-tuning argument for God. They claim
that the question of the universe’s fine-tuning ought not be ‘why is the
universe so hospitable to life?’ but rather ‘why is the universe so hospitable
to morally valuable minds?’ and that, moreover, the universe isn’t so
hospitable.
For it is
metaphysically possible that psychophysical laws be substantially more
permissive than they in fact are, allowing for the realisation of morally
valuable consciousness by exceptionally simple physical states and systems,
rather than the complex states of brains.
I reply that Sinhababu’s
argument rests upon unsupported claims and that we have reason to doubt that an
omnibenevolent God would make the psychophysical laws more permissive than they
in fact are.
Physical cosmologists
claim that the universe is balanced on a razor’s-edge as far as human life is
concerned. Our existence would be impossible had not various forces and
constants taken the values that they in fact do. In some cases, minute
diferences in those values would have entailed a universe devoid of any
structure, let alone the complexity to support life.
Three examples of such
fne-tuning observations are as follows:
·
Gravity
·
Rate of expansion of early universe
·
Strong nuclear force
Against Sinhababu’s
argument:
Against Indifference Objections to the Fine-Tuning Argument
(Prof. Metcalf)
Explaining the Physicality of the Universe:
The Argument from
Compatibility:
1. Given theism, any feature F that the
actual world ends up having will, with probability unity, be G-compatible.
2. Given atheism, any feature F that the
actual world ends up having will, with probability less-than-unity, be
G-compatible.
3. Therefore, for any feature F that the
actual world ends up having, the probability, given theism, that F will be
G-compatible is higher than the probability, given atheism, that F will be
G-compatible.
4. A world’s being physical is
G-compatible.
5. Therefore, a world’s being physical is prima facie
evidence for theism over atheism.
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